The next major conflict to see SAMs used in anger was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, named “Operation Peace for Galilee”, and intended to drive the PLO out of Lebanon. This well thought out and planned campaign was an absolute rout of the Syrian SAM belt installed in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon. The first attack of the 9th June, 1982, saw 17 of the 19 Syrian SAM batteries annihilated, the Israelis using airborne standoff jammers extensively, and supported by emitter locating systems, also fired large numbers of AGM-45 Shrike and AGM-78 Standard anti-radiation missiles,in addition to domestically modified Shrikes with rocket boosters, launched from trucks like Katyusha rockets. Crippled and defenceless SAM batteries were then annihilated with free fall bombs.

The Soviet doctrine of ambush attacks, SAM system mobility, clever use of emission control and decoys, camouflage of SAM sites, and the use of supporting electronic warfare assets was abandoned by the Syrians completely. Hurley’s summary of Syrian behaviour in the Winter 1989 issue of Air Power Journal is perhaps the best summary:

“Syrian SAM operators also invited disaster upon themselves. Their Soviet equipment was generally regarded as quite good; Syrian handling of it was appalling.

As noted by Lt Gen Leonard Perroots, director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, “The Syrians used mobile missiles in a fixed configuration; they put the radars in the valley instead of the hills because they didn't want to dig latrines -- seriously.” The Syrian practice of stationing mobile missiles in one place for several months allowed Israeli reconnaissance to determine the exact location of the missiles and their radars, giving the IAF a definite tactical advantage on the eve of battle. Even so, the Syrians might have been able to avoid the complete destruction of their SAM complex had they effectively camouflaged their sites; instead, they used smoke to “hide” them, which actually made them easier to spot from the air. It is ironic that the Syrians, who have been criticized for their strict adherence to Soviet doctrine, chose to ignore the viable doctrine that emphasizes the utility of maneuver and camouflage. According to a 1981 article in Soviet Military Review, alternate firing positions, defensive ambushes, regular repositioning of mobile SAMs to confuse enemy intelligence, and the emplacement of dummy SAM sites are fundamental considerations for the effective deployment and survivability of ground-based air defenses.”

The 1982 Bekaa Valley debacle was repeated on a much larger scale in January, 1991, when US led Coalition air forces annihilated Saddam’s SAM defences, the decisive blows inflicted in the first few hours. While that campaign is well documented in detail elsewhere, like the 1982 campaign, large scale use was made of anti-radiation missiles, support jamming, and precision weapons. The deployment pattern of Saddam’s forces also differed little, with few batteries attempting to exploit any inherent mobility in their systems, and often undisciplined emissions permitting easy location, targeting and attack. The composition of Saddam’s SAM force comprised much the same SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-8 and SA-9 SAM systems, supplemented by some modern French supplied Thales Roland SAMs and Tiger series radars.

The common thread running through the latter Middle Eastern SAM vs air power campaigns is very clear – the use of ageing and often obsolescent SAM and radar technology and the abandonment of the by then mature Soviet doctrine of SAM system mobility, concealment, deception and mutual support. Most of the fire control and search radars used were by then fully compromised to the West, and highly effective electronic countermeasures were available.

There is another consideration, which is difficult to establish through published sources, which is that of the education, training, proficiency and competencies of the SAM battery crews operating Syrian and Iraqi systems during this period.

Study of the plethora of detailed technical materials now available on Soviet SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, SA-6 and SA-8 SAM systems, and discussions with former Warsaw Pact missileers, indicate that the full effectiveness and performance potential of these first and second generation Soviet SAMs required crews which were highly intelligent, with a good technical education, and both very highly trained and proficient. Tight teamwork in the missile control van was essential, as the crew had to integrate and interpret outputs from multiple sensors, using often rudimentary analogue displays. Critical tasks such as initial target acquisition, and target tracking, were more than often performed manually, with the operator having to concurrently interpret more than one display output, in real time. Limited electronic counter-counter measures were available, requiring a smart operator to interpret and understand the type of hostile jamming, to manually select alternate frequencies and modes.

This was paralleled by challenging demands for technical personnel, especially in the setup and tear down of SA-2 and SA-3 batteries, which a highly proficient crew could relocate in about six hours. Launchers and vans had to be deployed, everything connected by cable harnesses, antennas needed alignment, and the whole system had to be tested before it could go online. While the SA-6 and SA-8 were designed for shoot and scoot mobility, maintenance of their complex systems was no less challenging, requiring vanloads of test equipment. Training for all of these systems required a van full of equipment to provide simulation inputs for the SAM control system.

The failure of Syrian and Iraqi missileers to follow Soviet operational doctrine, tactics and deployment technique indicates that the root cause of poor effectiveness in combat was deeply deficient training of missileers, and prima facie, also support personnel. The effectiveness of the very same SAM systems, operated by Soviet, Warsaw Pact and PAVN personnel, was vastly better, whether in the Middle East or South East Asia.

The 1999 bombing of Serbia is the case study, which closes this loop. While Serbian SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 batteries were largely ineffective due to the use of standoff jamming, anti-radiation missiles and stealth, they also proved vastly more difficult to kill due to smart use of mobility, camouflage and emission control. A single SA-3 battery, commanded by then LtCol Zoltan Dani, downed an F-117A and an F-16C, and damaged another F-117A. Prior to the conflict, Dani worked his crew for weeks in the simulator, driving up proficiency and crew teamwork. During the conflict, he relocated his battery as frequently as possible, and exercised strict emission control. His battery survived and inflicted the single most embarrassing combat loss the US has suffered for decades. Serbian SA-6 crews, following the same hide, shoot and scoot doctrine, mostly survived the war. The Serbian SAMs and radars were largely of the same vintage and subtypes, as those used by the Iraqis and Syrians. The fact that NATO forces were unable to quickly kill off the Serbian SAM batteries forced continuing and ongoing sorties by NATO support jamming and defence suppression aircraft, driving up the cost to drop each bomb delivered several-fold. NATO forces launched 743 AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missile rounds for very little damage effect – around one third of the number used to cripple Iraq’s much larger air defence system in 1991.

If we compare Desert Storm to Allied Force, the SAM systems were largely the same, but NATO had better electronic warfare systems, many more Emitter Locating Systems, and an abundance of newer smart munitions, including newer and better anti-radiation missiles. The fundamental difference was in the personnel operating the SAM systems – better educated, better trained, and highly motivated.

The Yugoslav Air Defence had twenty-two SA-6 batteries. Using shoot and scoot tactics, the self-propelled ground system demonstrated a good surviability with only three radars lost in the face of nearly four-hundred AGM-88 shots, but the system proved to be very ineffective having fired 477 missiles without a single success, at the same time. As comparison the fixed SA-2 and SA-3 sites demonstrated a similar low rate success, but suffered losses to around 66 to 80 percent.