Menunggu Drone Presiden Jokowi
4/02/15, 13:16 WIB



AWAL pemerintahan Kabinet Kerja Presiden Joko Widodo (Jokowi) ditandai gencarnya penyergapan terhadap para pencuri ikan, dilanjutkan dengan upacara pembakaran dan penenggelaman kapal mereka. Akhir 2014 ditutup dengan kecelakaan pesawat terbang AirAsia QZ8501 di Selat Karimata. Awal 2015 BNN berhasil membongkar penyelundupan 800 kg sabu-sabu melalui laut oleh sindikat internasional.

Kita jadi ingat janji kampanye Presiden Jokowi yang akan menggunakan drone atau pesawat tanpa awak (unmanned aerial vehicles) untuk mengamankan wilayah laut RI. Apa mungkin akan banyak kapal pencuri ikan yang berskala besar dan canggih –bukan pencuri tradisional– yang bisa disergap? Apa mungkin pencarian dan penyelamatan atas korban AirAsia bisa lebih berhasil dilakukan? Apa mungkin sebagian besar penyelundupan lewat jalur laut bisa ditanggulangi?

Kabarnya, saat ini sudah ada drone idaman. Yaitu Global Hawk,bikinan perusahaan Northrop Grumman, AS. Nama lengkapnya RQ-4 Global Hawk. Varian barunya, MQ-4C Triton,dirancang khusus untuk pengawasan maritim (maritime surveillance). Angkatan Laut (AL) AS dikabarkan sudah memesan 68 unit Triton guna melengkapi drone pemburu kapal selam P-8A Poseidon(Jane’s Defense Weekly, 1 Oktober 2014).

Global Hawk sangat canggih: mampu membuat ringkasan hasil pengamatannya dengan sistematis dan mengirimkan kepada pusat komando dalam waktu seketika. Perantinya antara lain mata radar sintetis beresolusi tinggi (synthetic aperture radar/ SAR)dan sensor jarak jauh optik elektronik/infra merah (electronic-optical/infrared-EO/IR). Ia dapat terbang selama 30 jam tanpa henti serta mampu mengamati wilayah seluas 100.000 km persegidalam sehari. Harganya sekitar Rp 4,3 triliun per unit. Presiden bermaksud membeli tiga buah.

Keterbatasan

Dalam perspektif kemaritiman, Indonesia memang paling unik di dunia. Dari 5.180.053 km persegiwilayahnya, daratannya hanya 1.922.570 km persegi. Sisanya, sekitar 70 persen, berupa laut. Terdiri atas 17.000 pulau lebih sehingga memiliki garis pantai terpanjang di dunia, yaitu 81.000 km. Atau 14 persen dari garis pantai dunia. Memiliki batas laut dengan sepuluh negara (tabloid Diplomasi, 16 Oktober 2011).

Cukup alasan bila Jokowi memilih pembangunan maritim sebagai faktor pembeda dirinya dengan presiden-presiden sebelumnya. Namun, dengan drone tak lantas masalah kedaulatan dan penegakan hukum di wilayah laut RI tuntas. Drone sebatas membantu tugas pengawasan, mengumpulkan dan mengirim informasi yang akurat dan seketika.

Info penting itu akan sia-sia kalau kekuatan operator di medan laut lemah. Agar kinerja drone bisa maksimal, sepadan dengan harga dan biaya operasionalnya yang sangat mahal (per jam terbang hingga USD 32 ribu), harus dibarengi peningkatan kekuatan laut, terkhusus TNI-AL.

Pasal 9 UU 34/2004 tentang TNI menyatakan, TNI-AL tidak hanya melaksanakan tugas TNI matra laut di bidang pertahanan, tetapi juga tugas polisional, yakni menegakkan hukum dan menjaga keamanan di wilayah laut. Seperti apa pun Badan Keamanan Laut (Bakamla) yang akan dibentuk, sesuai amanat pasal 59 ayat 3 UU 32/2014 tentang Kelautan, TNI-AL akan tetap menjadi bagian terpenting dan tulang punggungnya.

Green-Water Navy

Desain kekuatan TNI-AL kita di dalam istilah nondoktrinal disebut green-water navy. Yaitu sebuah kekuatan AL yang dirancang untuk beroperasi di dalam perairan suatu negara, namun memiliki kemampuan beroperasi di laut terbuka di sekitar negara itu. Berbeda dengan blue-water navy, yaitu kekuatan AL yang mampu beroperasi di perairan dalam dan laut bebas ala negara-negara yang berambisi menjadi penguasa di laut bebas.

Perkembangan geostrategis kawasan saat ini, serta rencana strategis Indonesia di sektor maritim, mengharuskan desain TNI-AL sebagai green-water navy perlu dikaji lagi. Sebagai bandingan, India, misalnya, sebagai salah satu negara yang memiliki batas laut dengan Indonesia sedang membangun kekuatan blue-water menyusul Tiongkok dan Jepang. Agaknya, kehadiran AL Tiongkok di lautan India mulai mengusik New Delhi. India dan Tiongkok juga berlomba memperkuat kehadirannya di kawasan strategis Selat Malaka. Sebanyak 40 persen perdagangan dunia serta 80 persen impor minyak Tiongkok melewati selat ini (The South Asia Channel, 4 Agustus 2014).

Mulai 2013 India mengoperasikan kapal pengangkut pesawat dengan kapasitas besar, yaitu INS Vikramaditya (45.400 ton). Kapal induk itu dapat mengangkut 36 pesawat, termasuk 30 pesawat tempur MiG-29K multi-role fighters. Korsel juga telah memodifikasi kapal pengangkut helikopter (landing platform helicopter/LPH) kelas Dokdo sehingga mampu mengangkut pesawat tempur yang dapat lepas landas dan mendarat secara vertikal (vertical take-off and landing/VTOL). Pada 2036 AL Korea Selatan diproyeksikan menjadi kekuatan blue-water dengan menambah dua kapal pengangkut pesawat berbobot 30.000 ton (DefenseNews.com, 26 Oktober 2013).

Mau tak mau, TNI-AL harus meningkatkan kekuatannya. Antara lain, perlu dipersenjatai dengan kapal pengangkut pesawat tempur (aircraft carrier).Tidak harus kapal sebesar INS Vikramaditya. Cukup dengan kapal pengangkut-pesawat ringan (light aircraft carrier) yang bisa digerakkan ke penjuru laut Indonesia dengan relatif cepat. Barangkali tipologi yang cocok adalah kapal pengangkut pesawat Juan Carlos I milik Spanyol, yang berbobot 26.000 ton. Mampu menampung 900 personel, 40 lebih kendaraan amfibi, termasuk tank Leopard 2E, dan 12 pesawat tempur Harrier IIserta beberapa helikopter. Indonesia, dengan PT PAL-nya (kerja sama dengan Daesun Shipbuilding & Engineering Co Korsel), telah mampu membuat kapal landing platform dock kelas dunia. Hal itu bisa jadi modal untuk membangun light aircraft carrier sendiri.

Selain belanja alutsista, yang sama sekali tidak boleh ditinggalkan adalah adanya skema kerja sama riset dan alih teknologi. Dan dari pengalaman beberapa negara maju, manfaat riset di bidang teknologi militer serta pembangunan industri pertahanan akan menimbulkan efek melimpah (spillover effect) bagi kemajuan industri dan teknologi sipil.
http://www.jawapos.com/baca/opinidet...residen-Jokowi


Are we winning the drone war?
APRIL 24, 2015
Doyle McManus
LOS ANGELES TIMES

Drone War in Afghanistan &Syria, The FILM




Almost two years ago, President Obama announced that he was tightening the rules under which the CIA carries out drone strikes against suspected terrorists in Pakistan, Yemen and other countries. “Before any strike is taken, there must be a near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured — the highest standard we can set,” he said.

Afterward, civilian casualties did, in fact, fall significantly, according to independent monitoring groups. One of those groups, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, says four civilian deaths have been reported in Pakistan in the 16 months since the end of 2013, down dramatically from a high of 197 in 2010.

But Obama's higher standard wasn't enough to avoid the unintended killing of two civilian hostages, one American and one Italian, in a Jan. 15 drone strike in Pakistan. As the White House acknowledged this week, the CIA didn't know that Warren Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto were being held at the target site.

Nor did the new rules protect two other U.S. citizens who had joined Al Qaeda from being killed the same week, even though they weren't specifically targeted for elimination. If they had been targeted, the two Americans' cases would have received high-level review — another Obama reform. But the CIA didn't know that Adam Gadahn and Ahmed Farouq were in its crosshairs, because those strikes weren't aimed at specific individuals; they were aimed at sites where suspicious activity was going on. The CIA calls these “signature strikes,” because they're based on troubling patterns that would seem to indicate Al Qaeda's presence.

Most of the time, “the United States simply does not know who it is killing,” says Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations.

If that makes you feel a bit queasy, you're not alone. In 2013, Obama aides said the president wanted to phase out signature strikes — but that hasn't happened. In both Pakistan and Yemen, U.S. drones are still shooting at suspected Al Qaeda members without knowing exactly who they are.

And that isn't the only problem with our mostly invisible drone war, which is now in its eighth year. We don't even know whether we're winning.

“Our actions should meet a simple test: We must not create more enemies than we take off the battlefield,” Obama said in another of his drone-reform speeches, this one in 2014.

When the drone wars began, back in 2008, Al Qaeda's active membership was estimated at roughly 300, mostly in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Drone strikes succeeded in reducing that number and making “Al Qaeda Central” largely ineffective.

But the group's offshoots have burgeoned. The most dangerous, based in Yemen, has grown to more than 1,000 members, even though it has been the target of a sustained U.S. drone campaign for six years.

Worse, the drone wars have made us other enemies. As recently as last year, Obama described Yemen as a success story, because the government of Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi enthusiastically supported U.S. counter-terrorism efforts.

But other Yemenis disliked seeing their country turned into a target range for foreign military forces. The Houthi rebels who toppled Hadi in January cited his alliance with the United States as one of their complaints — even though they, too, have been fighting Al Qaeda.

As a result of the ensuing civil war, U.S. bases in Yemen have been evacuated and U.S. intelligence efforts have been disrupted. The drone strikes against Al Qaeda have continued, officials say, but they've been less effective than before.

Nevertheless, CIA Director John O. Brennan said this month at a Harvard event that he thinks the war on terrorism is succeeding overall, that the world would look even worse without a major counter-terrorism campaign that included drone strikes. “We would be facing a horrendous, horrendous environment,” he said.

When it comes to Al Qaeda's ability to launch another 9/11 style attack against the United States, he's surely right. But when it comes to the larger phenomenon of militant groups spreading from Islamic State in Iraq and Syria to Boko Haram in Nigeria, the evidence of success is far less clear.

There's a lot to like about lethal drones — as long as you're the owner, not the target, of course. They're precise; they're agile; they're less costly than many of the alternatives, including manned bombers and boots on the ground.

But, too often, the drone strikes themselves “seem to be the strategy, rather than a tactic used within a larger strategy,” said Rachel Stohl, director of a task force on drone policy for the nonpartisan Stimson Center.

Obama said last week that he's ordered a review of the January strike, but it's going to be narrowly focused, aimed at determining why the CIA didn't know that two civilian hostages were present at a target site.

What the Obama administration really needs, though, is something it hasn't done for at least two years: a top-to-bottom review of its drone policies — focused not only on targeting rules, but also on costs and benefits. We need a public answer, complete with real evidence, to the president's own question: Are we creating more enemies than we take off the battlefield?
source: http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed...26-column.html